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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN D. ~IARSHALL, 
Plaintiff a;n.d A~ppeUan.t, 
vs. 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY 
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
Defenaant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
7407 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be designated as in the trial court. 
All italics are ours. 
All record citations of testimony refer to the se~ond 
trial transcript unless otherwise designated. 
John D. Marshall, an empJoyee of the Southern Pa-
cific Railroad Company, was injured in defendant's 
passenger depot at Ogden, Weber County, Utah, at 
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approximately 9 :00 o'clock a.m., on the 19th day of 
June, 1947, while in the course of his employment as a 
chair car porter for the Southern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany. 
This action was commenced in the Second Judicial 
District, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, on 
March 1st, 1948. The case was first tried before the 
Honorable John A. Hendricks on the 1st and 2nd days 
of July, 1948, the jury returning a verdict in the sum of 
$8,500.00, in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant filed 
a motion for new trial and said Judge, after the motion 
had been argued by respective counsel, entered an order 
granting said motion. (R. 038). 
The case was tried a second time before the Hon-
orable L. Leland Larson, on the 23rd and 24th day.s of 
February, 1949, the jury returning a verdict of No Cause 
for Action in favor of the defendant and against the 
plaintiff. Thereafter plaintiff moved for a new trial and 
plaintiff's motion was on the 22nd day of April, 1949, 
denied by said judge (R. 144). 
Plaintiff hereby appeals from the order of Judge 
Hendricks granting defendant's motion for a new trial 
and also from certain errors committed by the Honorable 
L. Leland Larson, Judge, during the progress of the 
second trial of the case. 
The facts. as herein set forth and discussed are 
those presented at the se~ond trial. They are substan-
ti·ally the same as were pres·ented at the first trial. 
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B. THE FACTS 
John D. Marshall, a resident of San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, was injured at approximately 9 :00 o'clock a.m., 
on the 19th day of J nne, 194 7 at the Depot of the de-
fendant company in Ogden, Utah, while in the course 
of his employment as a chair car porter for the Southern 
Pacific Railroad Company. At the time of his injuries 
he was 30 :~ears of age. He had been employed by the 
Southern Pacific Railroad Company approximately five 
years, during which time he had worked as a chair car 
porter (H. 6). His duties as a chair car porter were 
generally assisting passengers on and off trains, hand-
ling luggage and keeping the car, to which he was as-
signed, clean (R. 6). Prior to his employment with the 
Southern Pacific Railroad Company plaintiff had worked 
at various odd jobs, all involving general manual labor 
(R. 6, 7). During the month of June, 1947, and when 
injured, plaintiff was working on trains operating be-
tween Oakland, California and Ogden, Utah (R. 7, 8). 
The tracks in the Ogden Union Depot extend in a 
general northerly-southerly direction. Track No. 7 is 
immediately to the east of Tra;ck No. 8, etc. Passengers 
approaching trains on said tracks pass through an under-
path rampway onto the platforms between the tracks 
and usually proceed north to where the passenger trains 
are stationed (R. 8). Between Tracks No. 7 and No. 8 
is a cement platform approximately 18 feet in width. 
Extending down the center of the platform are certain 
posts known as ''umbrella posts'' wh:lch support a can-
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opy over the platform for protection in inclement weather 
.(R. 9). 
At its depot in Ogden the defendant customarily uses 
four-wheeled trucks in handling freight. These trucks 
were described by plaintiff as being approximately six 
or eight feet in length, three feet in width, two and one-
half or three fe·et in height. They have four metal wheels 
and a tongue in front which '.can be attached to a small 
three-wheeled jitney used in pulling them from place to 
place within the depot (R. 10). Plaintiff's Exhibit" A" 
is a photograph of such a truck and jitney. 
On the morning he was injured plaintiff approached 
his train at approximately 8:30 o'clock a.m. At that time 
the train was on Track No.8, facing north and plaintiff's 
chair car was four or five cars south of the head end of 
of the train. 
One of the umbrella posts was south of the north 
entrance to plaintiff's chair car. Standing with its south 
end against the post and on a slight northwest diagonal 
was one of the four-wheeled trucks heretofore described. 
The distance between the side of the chair car and the 
umbrella post was nine feet as measured by the plain-
tiff shortly before the second trial (R. 22). The truck's 
width was approximately three feet. Therefore, there 
was at least seven or eight feet of space between the 
east side of the coach and the truck within which ave-
hicle could pass. 
As to the occurrence of the a~ident, there is a ·sharp 
dispute in the testimony. For the convenience of the 
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court we present herewith the various versions as related 
by the respective "itnesses. 
Marshall testified that he approached his car, 
checked to see if it was clean, placed the step box down 
next to the north entrance to his chair car and took a 
position eight or ten inches south of the step box, with 
his back to the east side of the car. He testified that he 
was at all times before the accident looking toward the 
south for two small unescorted boys who were to ride 
in his car that morning (R. 11-14); and that the first 
time he saw the jitney and four-wheeled truck was when 
Miller, the operator, drove past him (R. 15); that as 
the jitney went past him he stepped back against the 
side of his chair car; that the truck being drawn by the 
jitney was carrying several trash boxes (R. 22). 
He further testified that at the time the jitney drove 
past him it was proceeding faster than a person could 
walk (R. 23), and that after the truck struck him he fell 
to the platform (R. 20). Marshall's testimony regarding 
the odcurrence of the accident is as follows (R. 14): 
'' Q. All right. I want you to now relate to the 
jury just a little what happened. 
A. I was standing there waiting for these two 
little kids, and when I know anything, this 
jitney came by and I stepped back. It was 
too late for me to go anyway but that. The 
truck Mr. Miller was hauling hit the corner 
of the other truck and it hit me here (indica-
ting), and put me against the train here (in-
dicating). 
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Q. At the time you first realized that the jitney 
tractor was traveling along the platform, 
where was the front end of the tractor~ 
A. It was passed by. 
Q. You became aware of its presence as it passed 
by~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And at that time what did you do? 
A. Stepped back.'' 
Marshall testified clearly that there wa.s plenty of 
room for the jitney and truck to have passed between 
him and the standing trU:ck. His testimony in that re-
gard is as follows (R. 30} : 
'' Q. Mr. Marshall, one other matter; I want to 
ask you this question: Was there space 
enough between the sides of the car.s lo:cated 
on track No. 8 and the protruding northwest 
corner of the standing four-wheel truck, was 
there space enough between there and be-
tween where your body was located ·and the 
northwest corner of the four-wheeled truck 
of the jitney and the other truck to have 
passed at the time this accident happened~ 
A. There was plenty of room.'' 
And on cro.ss-examination (R. 31) : 
'' Q. Mr. Marshall, there was plenty of room if 
the trucks hadn't cornered~ 
A. Plenty of room, sir.'' 
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Hamilton, a braken1an for the Southern Pacific Rail-
road Company and the only disinterested witness, testi-
fied that he was che'cking the numbers of the cars when 
he observed Marshall standing a short distance south of 
the step box at the north entrance of his chair car and 
that ~Iar~hall appeared to be looking toward the south 
(R. 62); that he observed the jitney and truck proceeding 
in a southerly direction; that he looked away and was 
just going to take down the number of a coach when he 
heard something bang and saw Marshall fall (R. 63). 
He was unable to form an estimate as to the speed at 
which the jitney and truck were proceeding as he ob-
served them traveling south and past the ladies coach. 
He te~tified in regard to the movement of the vehicle as 
follows (R. 67): 
'' Q. About how far was the jitney and the four-
wheeled truck from the point of impa:ct when 
you last saw it up there, before the impact~ 
A. I saw him coming by the baggage car, and 
after that I saw it coming by the ladies coach. 
I was checking there and I didn't notice it any 
more until it hit. 
Q. About how long after you saw it by the ladies 
coach was it that you heard the impact~ 
A. Oh, about as fast as I could walk, about three 
miles an hour, maybe.'' 
This te~timony clearly indicates that the tractor and 
~: four-wheeled truck did not stop in its progress toward 
the south before the actual impact. Hamilton saw Mar-
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shall fall to the platform after he heard the bang oc-
casioned by the impact (R. 63). 
Hamilton was never asked whether or not there was 
sufficient and adequate space for the jitney and four-
wheeled truck to have passed between where Marshall 
was standing and the truck located next to the umbrella 
post. 
LeRoy Miller, who had been employed by defendant 
company for approximately four and ·one-half years and 
was the operator of the jitney and truck at the time of 
the accident, testified on behalf of defendant. He stated 
that he had been picking up rubbish boxes during the 
course of the morning; that immediately before the ac-
cident he was proceeding in a southerly direction along 
the platform and saw Marshall working near the coaches 
on Train No. 23 ; that Marshall was standing south of his 
foot box but that his foot box was opposite the south 
entrance to the ladies coach; that Marshall was ''between 
the couplings'' (R. 106). He testified that he stopped and 
told Marshall to '' kinda step out'' and that Marshall 
stepped back and he started forward, and that as he 
started forward Marshall was standing still; that the 
front corner of his truck struck the corner of the standing 
truck causing his truck to swing around and strike the 
car (R. 106). He testified that the jitney and truck was 
just barely moving at the time the accident occurred, but 
that nevertheless the truck slid sideways on its wheels 
across the platform and struck the side of the ladies 
chair car with a bang causing a dent in the car (R. 14-16). 
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He further stated that as he went around Marshall he 
started to pull out to keep from hitting Marshall and 
that he never did look at the truck to his left during the 
forward movement of the jitney and four-wheeled truck. 
His testimony in regard to his own conduct as he pro-
ceeded past :Marshall is interesting and is set forth herein 
as follows (R. 116) : 
''Q. Weren't you watching the car~ 
A. No, I was watching Marshall. 
Q. Didn't you ever watch the truck~ 
A. No, I never looked at the truck. 
Q. You could see that car~ 
A. I didn't pay any attention. 
Q. You could have seen if you had looked~ 
A. I didn't look at it. My wagon wasn't two 
feet from that wagon, I came up to put the 
box on. 
Q. If you had looked over to the east, you :could 
have seen that car, couldn't you~ 
A. I could have. There wasn't nothing between 
me, hut I wasn't paying any attention. 
Q. You thought you could get by Mr. Marshall~ 
A. I asked him to move his foot box and move 
to the east. 
Q. He didn't move, did he~ 
A. He says he had plenty of room, and I went 
on and caught the end of the wagon and it 
swung around and hit the car, and I asked 
him, did it hit you in the stomach~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
Miller never testified directly as to whether or not 
there was sufficient and adequate space for him to have 
passed between Marshall and the standing truck in the 
middle of the platform next to the umbrella post. How-
ever, his proceeding as he did clearly indicates he was 
of the opinion that there was sufficient and adequate 
space. His testimony that he swung out without looking 
toward the east clearly ind~cates that his swinging out 
was the thing which caused the impact of the vehicles 
and the resulting accident (R. 116). The only inference 
that can be drawn from Miller's testimony is that there 
was actually sufficient space for him to have passed had 
he kept a lookout on both sides of his vehicle rather than 
on merely one. 
Kenneth Malan, a car washer and witness called 
by defendant, testified that he was washing the head end 
of Train No. 23 at the time the accident took place·; that 
he was about in the middle of Marshall's car (R. 92). 
He saw Marshall just before the accident standing just 
south of his step box which was located at the north 
entrance of his chair car. In this regard Malan clearly 
supports the testimony of Marshall and Hamilton. He 
further testified that Miller stopped two or three feet 
north of where Marshall was standing; that Miller and 
Marshall had a conversation and that thereafter the 
truck and trailer proceeded on to the south (R. 93, 94); 
that the moving truck ·struck the corner of the standing 
truck throwing the rear end of the moving truck on a 
diagonal to the west and toward Marshall (R. 95) ; that 
at the time of the accident the speed of the tractor was 
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approximately that of a man walking very slowly (R. 
10:2). However, he admits that the truck skidded side-
ways across the platform and that the rear end of the 
truck struck either Marshall or the chair car (R. 95) ; 
that after the accident ~Iarshall squeezed himself out 
from between the truck and the chair car, walked around 
and leaned on the wagon; that a brakeman walked over 
and asked :Jiarshall how he felt and stated that he ought 
to go sit down and rest (R. 96, 97). Malan assumed that 
he was struck by the truck as he saw him double up, 
make his way over and lean against the other truck 
(R. 98). 
l\falan testified that after Miller started forward 
with the jitney and tru.ck he, Malan, moved up against 
the car in anticipation of the movement of the vehicle 
past him. That that was the manner in which he always 
handled this situation; that he never stepped to the other 
side of the platform when a jitney and truck were pro-
ceeding past him (R. 101, 102). He felt there was plenty 
of room for the jitney and truck to move past if he 
stepped up beside the ear (R.101). 
Louis Stegge also testified for defendant. He was 
by occupation a car man and at the time of the accident 
was working on a car to the north of where the accident 
occurred. He never was closer than twenty feet from 
where the accident occurred (R. 126). A reading of his 
testimony indicates that Stegge wasn't sure whether 
Marshall was standing south of the south entrance to the 
ladies car or south of the north entrance to Marshall's 
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chair car (R. 132, 133). It seems unbelievable that Mar-
shall would have been standing at the south entrance 
of the ladies car inasmuch as he had no duties to perform 
with regard to the ladies car. Marshall testified that the 
south end of the ladies car was a blind end and that there 
were no entrances lo:cated there whatsoever (R. 135). 
Stegge testified that Miller stopped a shqrt distance 
north of where Marshall was standing; that a conversa-
tion occurred between Miller and Marshall; that he saw 
Marshall signify by movement of his hand to come ahead 
and that the jitney and truck proceeded ahead about 
four or five feet when the standing truck and the moving 
truck cornered causing the moving truck to swing diag-
onally to the west. He admitted that Marshall was stand-
ing still as the vehicles proceeded past him, with his 
back to the east side of the coa;ch (R. 127). :Sitegge 
wasn't asked whether or not there was sufficient and 
adequate room for the jitney and truck to have passed 
between the standing truck and Marshall. · Therefore, 
his testimony must be considered as neutral in this 
regard, casting no inferences one way or the other. 
Plaintiff remained at the place where the accident 
happened for a short time and then made his way to 
the trainmaster's office (R. 21). Thereafter, he went 
to the office of the company doctor, which is located 
on Washington Boulevard, and from there was sent to 
St. Benedict's Hospital, where he remained for two 
days (R. 21). He then returned to Oakland by train, 
spent one night at home and the next day reported to 
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the Southern P~cific Hospital (R. 24). He was at the 
hospital continuously for approximately one week and 
thereafter remained as an out patient. The total period 
of his hospitalization at the Southern Pacific General 
Hospital was forty-four days (R. 25). During that period 
he was unable to work (R. 25, 26). In May of 1948 plain-
tiff was again hospitalized for a period of six days. 
He had mistakenly testified at the previous trial that 
he was hospitalized on this occasion for two weeks. 
During the six days of his hospitalization he underwent 
treatment and general observation. At the time of trial 
he was still experiencing pain in his back (R. 26-28). 
Plaintiff was earning approximately $218.00 per 
month at the time of his injury as a salary and in addi-
tion was making ·between $15.00 and $30.00 per month 
in tips (R. 29). 
Doctor Fisher, a regularly licensed physician, and 
specialist in orthopedic surgery, testified by deposition 
on behalf of the plaintiff. He examined plaintiff on 
December 20, 1947. The examination revealed muscle 
spasm in the lower area of plaintiff's back and that he 
was suffering from sub-a;cute low hack strain and a 
contusion of the lower abdomen together with a mild 
Schmorl 's disease of the spine. Schmorl 's disease is 
not caused by trauma, but prolongs the healing period 
(R. 83-84). His opinion was stated as follows (R. 84): 
''A. Yes, I feel if you are going to get this man 
well, I don't think that he is going to get 
well probably unless he shifts to s:ome type 
of work where he wouldn't have to do heavy 
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lifting for some considerable 'period of time, 
I would say at least six months and probably 
more, possibly more.'' 
The jury was warranted in finding aceording to plain-
tiff's testimony that he was standing against his car and 
looking to the south; that Miller drove the jitney and 
truck to and beyond his position at an excessive rate of 
speed without keeping a lookout, cornered the standing 
vehicle and caused the accident. The jury was also war-
ranted in finding from defendant's evidence that Miller 
approached Marshall and stopped; that a conversation 
o'ccurred; that Marshall took a position back against 
the coach and that Miller proceeded beyond him, cor-
nered with the standing vehicle causing the accident. 
It was uncontroverted that Marshall, after the vehicle 
had once started past him, never moved from the posi-
tion he had taken and was at all times observed and 
observable by Miller. It is uncontroverted that the truck 
cornered with the standing truck, skidded sideways 
a:cross the platform and toward and into the plaintiff. 
It is uncontroverted that Miller, as he proceeded past 
plaintiff, was not keeping any lookout whatsoever to the 
eaot but was looking solely in the direction of Marshall 
who was standing against the coach. It was uncontro-
verted that there was plenty of room forr the jitnevy o;n;d 
truck to have passed between the p~laJirntiff and the st~andi 
ilng truck had defendant ope'nated the jitney and truck 
in an efficient manner; that Marshall could have done 
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nothing- further to avoid the accident once the jitney 
passed him, and that the cause of the accident was the 
~ornering of the vehicles. 
ASSIGNniENT OF ERRORS 
1. The court erred in granting defendant's motion 
for new trial (R. 038). 
2. The court erred in refusing to give Plaintiff's 
Requested Instruction No. 3 (second trial) (R. 042). 
3. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 7 
(second trial) (R. 063, 064). 
4. The court erred rn giving Instruction No. 11 
(second trial) (R. 066). 
5. The court erred in refusing to grant plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial following the second trial (R. 078). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOW DUE DILIGENCE 
IN DISCOVERING SO-CALLED NEWLY DISCOVERED 
EVIDENCE BEFORE AND DURING TRIAL AND INAS-
MUCH AS SUCH NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS 
FOR IMP,EACHMENT PURPOSES, ONLY AND DOES NOT 
APPEAR TO BE OF SUFFICIENT MATERIALITY TO HAVE 
AFFECTED THE VERDICT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL ON THAT BASIS. (As!sign-
ment of Error No.1). 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 7. (Assignment of 
Error No. 3). 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THE 
SUBMISSION OF THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY. (Assignment of 
Errors No.2, 3 and 5). 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT 
THE ISSUE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE TO THE JURY. 
(Assignment of Errors No.2 and 5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOW DUE DILIGENCE 
IN DISCOVERING SO-CALLED NEWLY DISCOVERED 
EVIDENCE BEFORE AND DURING TRIAL AND INAS-
MUCH AS SUCH NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS 
FOR IMP1EACHMENT PURPOSES ONLY AND DOES NOT 
AP,PEAR TO BE OF SUFFICIENT MATERIALITY TO HAVE 
AFFECTED THE VERDICT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL ON THAT BASIS. (Assign-
ment of Error No.1). 
We recognize the law to be well settled that the 
granting or denying of a motion for new trial is largely 
within the discr,etionary powers of the trial court. See 
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Moser v. Zion's Co-Op. lllercantile Inst. et ,az., (Utah) 
197 p. 2d 136. 
H·owever, appellate courts have traditionally exer-
~ised a supervisory control over the discretionary powers 
as exercised by trial courts and have on numerous occa-
sions reversed the rulings of trial courts in granting 
motions for new trial. It is manifestly clear that the 
discr~tionary power of trial courts is not a mental dis-
cretion giving effect to the will of the judge, but is a 
legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the 
spirit of the law. 
In Hayne, New Trial ,and Appe:al, vol. 2, Sec. 289, 
the author discusses the discretionary power of the trial 
court in granting or refusing to grant a motion for new 
trial and states as follows: 
'' * * * This is not always easy to determine, 
but the task is greatly simplified when it is re-
membered that the discretion referred to is legal 
and never arbitrary. There must be a legal 
ground or excuse for every act of the court, and 
not a mere arbitrary exercise of power by the 
will of the individual who happens to occupy the 
position of judge. Not only must there he a legal 
ground or excuse in support of the exercise of 
discretionary power, but there must be some fact 
or reason against the same, otherwise there would 
be no basis for an exercise of discretion. More-
over, the discretion of the court must always be 
exercised in behalf of justice and fair dealing 
in the abstract, and manifestly must not be con-
trary to the principles of justice or productive 
of hardship and inconvenience. If this should he 
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the case, there would be, in the language of the 
authorities, an abuse of discretion, and the appel-
late court would reverse the judgment or order. 
This is not a very precise rule; but, when inter-
preted by the light of the circumstances of each 
case, it is of practical value, and prevails in all 
courts where the common law is the rule of deci-
sion.'' 
We herein cite and discuss a number of cases in 
which appellate courts have set aside orders granting 
m·otions for new trial as abuses of legal discretion. 
In Hinton v. Peterson, et al., (Mont.) 169 P. 2d 333, 
334, the appellate court concluded from the facts that 
the court's action in granting the new trial was based 
upon the view of the court that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the verdict, and stated: 
"* * • The court disagreed with the jury 
on the issue of the terms of the contract of em-
ployment. The court accepted defendants' ver-
sion of it while the jury ~ccepted that of plain-
tiff.'' 
The case was remanded back to the trial court with 
instructions to set aside the ruling granting a new trial 
and to reinstate the verdict. The court cited the follow-
ing quotation from B·adboy v. Br-own, 66 Mont. 307, 213 
P. 246, 247 with approval: 
"* * *'While it is the general rule, frequently 
enunciated by this court, that the granting or 
refusing of a motion for a new trial· rests in the 
sound legal discretion of the trial court, yet this 
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diseretion is not so unrestricted as to permit the 
trial court to act arbitrarily, or without substan-
tial basis. Legal discretion must always be guided 
and controlled by legal principles. Montana 0. P. 
Co. v. Boston & ~I. C. C. & S. ~I. Co., 22 Mont. 
159, 56 P. 120. This court will not, as a rule, 
interfere \\ith the discretion vested in the trial 
court in granting or refusing a new trial; but 
when it appears, as it does in this case, that such 
discretion has been exercised without any suffi-
cient or substantial reason, then it must be con-
trolled. Holland v. Huston, 20 Mont. 84, 49 P. 
390. Here the abuse of discretion on the part of 
the trial court in granting to the defendant Brown 
a new trial is manifest, for there is no evidence 
or basis in the record for the court's order. 
'Under the statute, the amount of the verdict 
must of necessity rest in the sound discretion of 
the jury. The parties are entitled to a verdict 
from the jury, and it is only in rare instances 
that the 'court is justified in interfering, unless 
the record discloses that the elements of passion 
and prejudice have influenced the minds of the 
jurors in arriving at the result.' Hollenback v. 
Stone & Webster Eng. Corp., 46 Mont. 559, 129 P. 
1058. The jury having fixed the amount of plain-
tiffs' damages based on evidence warranting the 
verdict, and there being nothing in the record to 
indicate passion and prejudice, or warranting 
a reduction of the amount of the verdict, the trial 
court was clearly in error.' '' 
In Sharpensteen v. Sanguinetti (Ariz.) 262 P. 609, 
610, the appellate court reviewing the grounds upon 
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which a motion for new trial had been granted, dis-
cussed the facts as follows : 
''The affidavit of newly dis'covered evidence 
is not sufficient. It simply shows that affiant, I !he 
'acting for and on behalf of defendant' had made i 
discovery of what he calls evidence. So far as 
this affidavit is concerned, the defendant and his 
attorney may have known of such alleged evi-
dence at the time of and before the trial. A prope:r 
and sufficient ,affidavit should have negatived 
such possibility.'' 
And, in overruling the trial court's order granting 
a new trial stated at p. 611 : 
"It is of course the law that the granting of 
a new trial is largely in the discretion of the trial 
court, and that the reviewing court will not dis-
turb the ruling except for an abuse of that dis-
cretion. What is meant by discretion in that con-
nection is a legal discretion, one based upon 
reason and law. If the showing for a new trial 
is insufficient both iln form amd substarrvce:, as the 
one here appears to be, it may be s~aid that there 
is no discret~on to be exercised. The rule that 
should guide the trial judge in passing upon a 
motion for new trial is very well stated in Sov-
ereign Camp, etc., v. Thiebaud, 65 Kan. 332, 69 
P. 348, as follows: 1la1 
"'The discret'ion of &trict courts in the 
matte;r of grarnting or r-efusing neYtV' trials is 
,a legal, no't 'a oaJrPricious, one. It must be 
warranted by lmw, arnd guided by established 
preoedent. It mary noit be exercised ~mpl;y 
becOJUSe the jwdge might wish the verdict to1 
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be otherwise. The test and w~arrant ·for its 
use is, Has the ,applioaJY~Jt .therefor s·hown a 
legalrreason for >its existence?' " 
And in Belt 'l'. ill orris (Okla.), 34 P. 2d 581, 584, 
the court stated: 
'' • • * The 'discretion' spoken of in the 
authorities is a legal discretion; a discretion to 
be exercised in discerning the course preseribed 
by the law, according to prineiples ascertained 
by adjudged cases. 'J udrcial power, as eontra-
distinguished from the power of the law, has no 
existence,' it was said by Chief J ustiee Marshall 
in Osborn et al. v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 
738, 6 L. Ed. 204, 234. Courts are the mere instru-
ments of the law, and ean will nothing. Judicial 
power is not exercised forr the purpose of givitng 
effect to the will ·of the judge, but always for the 
:purpose of !}iving effect to the will of the law. 
To one coming within the rule anrnounc:ed, a new 
trial should be given ·as ·a matter of right, not 
merely as a result of the exercise of the oorurt's 
will. So, on the other harnd, whe;re the oourt: grants 
a new trial, but in doing so iJJisreg,ards the rules 
of law contr1o·lling the exercise of the pow·er, its 
action presents a question of law reviewable on 
appeal.' '' 
In Russell v. M.argo, (Okla.), 67 P. 2d 22, 26, the court 
stated: 
"In the case of Sprtice v. Chicago, R. & P. R. 
Co., 139 Okl. 123, 281 P. 586, 589, this court said: 
'The courts everywhere recognize the right of an 
appellate court to review the action of a trial 
court in sustaining motions for new trials where 
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there has been an abuse of discretion or arbitrary 
action. Otherwise the complete right of appeal 
could be denied in most instances, and in fact all 
instances. For example, the court could repeat-
edly in the same cause set aside the verdict of the 
jury and grant a new trial on the insuff~ciency 
of the evidence, and thereby deprive the party 
who obtained the verdict of the benefit of a com-
plete right of appeal. In other words, to vest in 
the trial courts absolute discretion as to questions 
of fact or miaJed quesf}ions of law arnd fiact would 
be an absolut-e barrie·r between the aggrieved liti-
gant .a.nd the Suprem.e Court.' 
"We agree with the holding of the court in 
the above case, and where the issue is properly 
presented on appeal, this court will review the 
entire record to determine whether or not the 
trial court in granting a motion for new trial 
has abused its discretion, acted arbitrarily, or 
erred on some unmixed question of law.'' 
In Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Ry. Oovrp., et. ·al. (Oal.), 
145 P. 2d 662, 666, the trial court granted a motion for 
new trial and the appellate court reversed that order 
and stated the governing principles of an appellate 
court in considering whether or not the granting of a 
motion for new trial was within the discretionary power 
of the trial court or beyond its discretion in the follow-
ing language : 
'' * * * While, as respondent asserts, court·s 
have often held that judicial discretion is broad 
and inclusive, nevertheless it is a legal discre-
tion, and must be exercised in consonance with 
fixed legal principles. Judidal discretion is neither 
capricious notr ·arbit~ary. As was saJi;d, in Baiky 
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v. Taaffe, 29 Cal. -l-22, 424, 'It is not a mental 
discretion, to be exercised ex gra.tia, but. a legal 
discretion, t·o be exercised in conformity with the 
spirit of the lalf, and in a manner to subserve and 
not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial 
justice.' The phrase ·'judicial discretion' implies 
the use of discriminating judgment within the 
bounds of reason and bridled by legal principles, 
the application of which will tend to promote' 
justice and equity. In the light of what has just 
been said, we now proceed to a consideration of 
the instructions given, and the giving of which, 
respondent urges, entitles him to a new trial.'' 
See also the following interesting cases: 
Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of The World, v. Thie-
baud, 65 Kan. 332, 69 P. 348; Rothrrrwm v. Rumb·ack 
(Ariz.), 96 P. 2d 755; Arthur v. Parish (Ore.), 47 P. 
2d 682. 
This ·case was tried before Judge Hendricks on July 
1st and 2nd, 1948. During the trial plaintiff testified 
regarding his hospitalization as follows (R. 18, 19, first 
trial): 
"Q. Now, have you missed any work since going 
back to work the second time~ 
A. Yes. I missed a couple of weeks here not 
long ago. I was in the hospital on the 25th 
of last month. 
Q. That would be May 25th~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long were you in the hospital on that 
occasion~ 
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A. Two weeks. 
Q. Were you continuously in the hospital during 
that two weeks~ 
A. Yes, I was in there for two weeks. 
Q. Were you an 'out' patient or in there all 
that time~ 
A. In the hoapital- no- no out patient. 
Q. What were you in the hospital for, Mr. 
Marshall~ 
A. My injury. 
Q. The condition of your back~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you receiving treatments of any kind 
during that two weeks~ 
A. Well, I was taking the same treatments. 
Q. Those heating-pad treatments~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were not, of course, able to work during 
that two weeks~ 
A. No, I ·wasn't. 
Q. Now, in addition to that two weeks have you 
missed any other work~ 
A. No, I didn't mios any other." 
At the conclusion of the case and after a verdict had 
been rendered in favor of plaintiff, counsel for defen-
dant filed a motion for new trial. Thereafter, he filed 
affidavits in support o.f said motion. The primary 
ground contended for by defenaant in its motion for new 
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trial was '• newly discovered evidence rna terial to the 
defendant which it could not with reasonable diligence 
have discovered and produced at the trial." (R. 147, 
first transcript). Thereafter, affidavits by Dr. Russell 
J. :Merritt, of the Southern Pacific Hospital, in San Fran-
cisco, California, and of M. J. Bronson, counsel for the 
defendant, were duly filed in support of defendant's 
motion. Counter-affidavits on behalf of plaintiff were 
also filed. John D. Marshall filed an affidavit as did 
Wayne L. Black, counsel for John D. Marshall, and 
Robert Asch, who is Assistant Business Manager of 
the Southern Pacific Hospital, at San Francis,co, Cali-
fornia. These affidavits are a part of the record. (R. 
151-160). Generally they are to the effect that Marshall 
was hospitalized from the 21st day of May, 1948 to the 
27th day of May, 1948, at which time he was discharged. 
Plaintiff's affidavit indicates that he was honestly mis-
taken as to the length of time he was hospitalized but 
that after the case had been tried and after he had 
been requested to check the records of the hospital he 
discovered that he was hospitalized one week rather than 
two weeks. 
The affidavit of Mr. M. J. Bronson, counsel for 
defendant, was to the effect that on May 15th, 1948, he 
was at San Francisco, California and investigated the 
hospital records to determine the length of plaintiff's 
hospitalization; that this was the only investigation 
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regarding plaintiff's hospitalization that he made until 
after the trial had been :completed, and up until the 
time plaintiff testified at the trial Mr. Bronson did not 
know that plaintiff was hospitalized in May of 1948. (R. 
153, 154). 
The affidavit of Mr. Wayne L. Black, counsel for 
the plaintiff, reveals that he called Mr. Bronson by tele-
phone on the 24th day of May, 1948 and notified him 
that this case could not be tried on May 26th, 1948 for 
the reason that plaintiff was at the time hospitalized 
in the Southern Pacific General Hospital. Mr. Black's 
affidavit further reveals that on or about the 25th day 
of June, 1948 he discussed this case with Mr. Miles E. 
Goodnow, General Claim Agent of defendant, and noti-
fied Mr. Goodnow of plaintiff's hospitalization during 
May of 1948 and that Mr. Goodnow, ever ·.since that date, 
was well aware of plaintiff's hospitalization in the South-
ern Pacific General Hospital (R. 157-159). Of course, 
it was within the discretion of the trial court to defer-
mine the facts as revealed by the affidavits. It is true, 
however, that defendant's affidavits did not controvert 
the fa1ct that Mr. Goodnow was notified before trial of 
plaintiff's hospitalization. 
The sole ground argued by counsel for defendant 
In its motion for new trial was that of the so-called 
newly discovered evidence. There was no argument made 
that the verdict was contrary to law or excessive. Judge 
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Hendricks followed the suggestion of this court in S:aUas 
v. Affleck et al., 105 P. 2d 176, 178, and set forth clearly 
and specifically his reasons for granting the motion. 
His order reads as follows (R. 038): 
"After studying the affidavits and trans-
cribed testimony of the plaintiff, and taking into 
consideration the emphasis that Plaintiff's Coun-
sel put on the defendant's confinement for two 
weeks in the hospital, the Court is of the opinion 
that the jury was influenced to the extent that 
they undoubtedly allowed excessive special dam-
ages, and also probably caused to award general 
damages in excess of what they would have 
awarded had they known the facts about his stay 
in the hospital in May. 
"It is therefore ORDERED, that a new trial 
be granted. 
"Dated this 28th day of August, 1948. 
J.ohn A. Hendricks 
District Judge'' 
The facts concerning the so-called newly discovered 
evidence being largely uncontroverted, it became a clear 
question of law whether the motion for new trial should 
have been granted. If the guiding principles of law 
laid down by this court were disregarded by the trial 
court in its ruling it follows as a ne:cessary conclusion 
that the trial court abused its legal discretion. 
The general rule of law governing the trial court 
in granting or denying a motion for new trial is set forth 
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in Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712, 714, where 
the court stated: 
"* * * 'It is well settled that, to entitle a 
defeated party to a new trial on the ground of 
newly-discovered evidence, it must ap~ar, (1) 
that he used reasonable diligence to discover and 
produce at the fo.rmer trial the newly-discovered 
evidence, and that his failure to do so was not 
the result of his own negligence; ( 2) that the 
newly-discovered evidence is not simply cumula-
tive; (3) that such evidence is not sufficient if it 
simply be to impeach an adverse witness; ( 4) 
it must be material to the issues, and so important 
as to satisfy the court, by reasonable inference, 
that the verdict or judgment would have been 
different had the newly-discovered evidence been 
introduced on the former trial; (5) that the de-
feated party had no opportunity to make the de-
fense, or was prevented from doing so by unavoid-
able accident, or the fraud or improper conduct 
of the other party, without fault on his part.' '' 
In at least three particulars the trial court violated 
established principle in granting defendant's motion for 
new trial. 
(a) The trial court abused its ibiscretion W'hetn it 
held in effect that -defendamt had exercised due diligence 
in endeavoring to ·ascertain the so-oalZe:d new·Zy disco'V·ered 
evidence prior t.o and ·at the time 10f the trial. 
Governing principles regarding defendant's. duty 
of diligence are stated in the following citations : 
39 A.m. Jur. Sec. 156, p. 163: 
'' * * * The rule to be dedtuced from the cases 
lis that where new[;y discovered evidence is of su,ch 
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conclusive nature, or of su.ch decisive or prep,on-
de.rating character, that it would with reasonable 
cer"bainty have chamged. the V·erdict or materially 
reduced the recovery, a new trial should be grant-
ed if ~t is satisfactorily shown why the evidence 
was not discovered and produced at the time of 
the trial.'' 
39 Am. Jur. Sec. 161, p. 168 ~and Sec. 163, p. 170: 
"Sec. 161.-What Constitutes Diligence in 
Procuring Evidence.-The question as to whether 
or not the party's failure to produce the newly 
discovered evidence at the trial was attributable 
to negligence or want of diligence is to be re-
solved, of course, in view of the circumstances 
of the case. Very evidently, if it is to be con-
cluded that he possessed, prior to the trial, no 
means of knowing that the evidence was obtain-
able, he is not 'chargeable with lack of diligence. 
On the other hand, the application for a new tr+bal 
will be denied where it ·appears that the degree 
of activity or diligenee which led to· the discove-ry 
of the evfidence ~after the trial would have pro-
duced it had it been exercised p'rior the~e:to. 
* * * * * * 
''Sec. 163.-Proof of Exercise of Diligence.-
Proof that the applicant has not been guilty of 
negligence or want of diligence must be pre-
sented by the supporting affidavits. The facts 
which disclose the exercise of diligenJpe must be 
- set forth; an averment of diligence in general 
terms is not sufficient. It has been said that the 
affidavit must be characterized by a greater de-
gree of certainty than is required in a pleading, 
and that the· averments thereof must negative 
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every circumstance from which negligence can 
be in£ erred.'' 
In Rydalch v. Anderson (Jan. 6, 1910), 37 Utah 99, 
107 P. 25, 31 this court laid down the rule regarding 
defendant's duty of diligence. 
"* * * Oownsel thus knew at the trial what 
respondent's testimorrvy was. If they did not think 
it was true, and we;re surprised by it, they should 
then have applied to the court to: postpone further 
trial of the ;case until they could obtain the t.est'i-
mony contradictory of respondent's statement. 
The question of oounsel's diligence in ascertain-
ing whether there was any such evid,ence, and in 
procuring it, would then have been presented to 
and considered by the trial court.'' 
And in Snell v. Cisler (Jan. 1876), 1 Utah 298, 303, 
the court stated : 
''The Defendant's affidavit, so far from 
showing any grounds for a new trial, ·shows a 
lack of 'diligence upon his part which is inex-
cusable. If a ~pwrty omits to procure evidence on 
the trial, which With !Ordinary diligenJpe he might 
have procured in reZat~on to~ the material issue 
in the case, his motion for ·a new trial ovught to 
be denied.'' 
See also HydraulJic Cemerl)t Block Co. v. Christensen, 
38 Utah 525, 114 P. 524, 526, where the court stated: 
''* * *Courts oa'fi!YI)ot grant new tr:mls meref;y 
becOJUSe a defe,ated pwrty, after an adverse de;ci-
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sian, ma.kes a. showing that upo.n ,a second trial he 
can produce additional evidence in support of his 
conte-nNo(ns which will probably turn the decision 
in his favor. He must use due diligence to pro-
duce his evidence when the case comes on for 
trial, and, unless he does so, the court is power-
less to help him. In this case there is no showing 
whatever that the plaintiff used any diligence 
to produce the alleged newly discovered evidence 
at the trial. The court, therefore, committed no 
error in overruling the motion for that reason.'' 
And Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Storutt, 54 Utah 100, 180 
P. 182, 184, where the court said: 
"* * * But assuming, further, that defendant 
was justified in believing that inasmuch as the trial 
was had in Salt Lake City, and the bank was also 
situated there, he might apply at any time, even 
on the eve of the trial, and procure the informa-
tion desired, nevertheless when appellant found at 
the trial that the books and records of the bank 
were inaccessible for the reasons stated, no mo-
tion was made for a continuance, and the trial 
court had no opportunity to afford relief even if 
it had been so inclined. Appellant elected to stand 
upon the proposition that it was the duty of the 
plaintiff to produce the records, and went to trial 
without the evidence which in the nature of the 
case he must have known was in existence and 
could easily be dis~overed. 
''Many of the ootho-rities ~above cited treat 
the failure of a party to seas~onably 1apply for ·a 
oontiwuarnce u,nder such dircumstarnces as fa"bal to 
am application for a new trial. 
''However, much the court might desire to 
see litigants in cases before it obtain every farth-
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ing to which they are entitled, yet it cannot ignore 
fundamental rules of practice established by 
statute and recognized by general law in order to 
achieve its :conception of even-handed justice in 
a particular case.'' 
In Rath v. Ba;nkst>on, et al (Cal. Oct. 17, 1929), 281 
P. 1081, 1086, judgment was for defendants and plaintiff 
appealed urging that the trial court should have granted 
a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. 
Affidavits revealed that plaintiff had discovered wit-
nesses who would testify that the truck and trailer in-
volved could have been backed to the curb and hence 
that the testimony of defendants' witness to the effect 
that such movement was impossible was false. The appel-
late court, in supporting the trial court's ruling denying 
the motion for new trial, stated: 
"* * * The fact that Case swore falsely 
(assuming such to be the fact merely for argu-
ment's sake) would not justify the contention that 
appellant was taken by surprise by his testimony. 
There is nothing to show that she was led to be-
lieve that his testimony would be other than it 
was, or that she did not have ample time to pre-
pare to meet every issue of fact relevant to the 
cause. As said in Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 P. 
970, 971, 13 L.R.A. 336, 25 Am. St. Rep. 159, a 
litig,ant ~at the trial 'must. be prepared t:or meet and 
expose perjury then and there.' The testimony 
of Case was given on May 21, 1926, atnd it would 
seem that appellant had ample time to make ·any 
inquiries ~as t:o its probable truth or falsity, as well 
as ,a;n,y ~actual test on the ground be:tween that tim.e 
arnd M~ay 24 when she rested her case. Moreover, 
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the affidavits on motion for new trial show that 
the 'test' was actually made on May 25, 1926, and 
as we have noted, when the case was reopened 
on ~lay 27, the record shows no offer of this tes-
timony by appellant.'' 
Mourning v. Harrison (Kan., Nov. 8, 1941), 154 Kan. 
242, 118 p. 2d 558, 559 : 
"In the early case of Smith v. Williams, 11 
Kan. 104, 106, it was stated: 'The motion was 
based on the ground of newly-discovered evi-
dence. While the rules by which motions of this 
kind must be determined are well settled, and 
clearly defined, yet in the application of these 
rules much must be left to the discretion of the 
trial court. When a 1case has been once fairly 
submitted to· a jury, the verdict .ought not t·o· be 
-disturbed, OJnd the successful vpa;rty put to the 
lahor, the expense, and the hazard of OJYtother 
tr"ial for any light or trivial reasons, 10r w,pon the 
mere possibility of a different verdict.' '' 
See also Geotrge G. Leavitt Co. v. Oouturier (Utah, 
July 12, 1933), 23 P. 2d 1101. 
In the case at bar defendant's only claim of due dili-
gence is that Mr. Bronson examined the S'outhern Pacific 
General Hospital records on the 15th day of May, 1948. 
Defendant's affidavits do not negative plaintiff's coun-
sel's sworn statement that Claim Agent Goodnow was 
informed on June 24th, 1948, a week before trial, that 
plaintiff claimed to have been hospitalized at the South-
ern Pacific General Hospital during the latter part of 
May, 1948. In spite of this fact no effort was made by 
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defense counsel to check on plaintiff's hospitalization 
until after an adverse verdict. Defendant's affidavits 
rather than showing the exercise of due diligence, show 
a lack of diligence of the grossest sort. If counsel con-
sidered the hospitalization issue to be so vital to his 
case why didn't he make a telephone call during or be-
fore the trial~ Why didn't he bring this matter to the 
attention of the trial court~ Why didn't he move for a 
continuance~ The facts were always easily and readily 
accessible. Why should plaintiff be saddled with the 
onerous burden of a new trial be:cau.se of opposing coun-
sel's inattention to his case~ If defendant had exercised 
that diligence before or during the trial which it exer-
cised after an adverse verdict, it is hardly disputable 
that his .so-called newly discovered evidence would have 
been fully revealed. 
We feel entirely justified in stating our contention 
that the trial court acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
when it granted a motion for new trial on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence without requiring defen-
dant to show as a ne;cessary condition precedent the exer-
cise of due diligence before and during the trial. 
(h) The trial court ·abused its discretion when it 
g'ranted defendant's motio.n for new trial on the baslis of 
·so-called newly discovered evidence w·hich was o'ffered 
and ultimately used for the sole pwrpose of impe·achment. 
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39 Am. Jur. Sec. 167, p. 173, states the rule regard-
ing newly discoYered impeachment evidence: 
''Sec.167. Impeaching Evidence; Testimony 
Contradicting Witness.-It is. well settled that a 
new trial will not be granted upon the ground of 
newly discovered evidence where it appears that 
such new evidence can have no other effect than 
to discredit the testimony of a witness at the 
original trial, contradict a witness's statements, 
or impeach a witness, unless the testimony of the 
"itness who is sought to be impeached was so 
important to the issue, and the evidence impe.ach--
ing the witness so strong arnd :c.onvinding, that a 
diffMent result must necessarily follow." 
In Rydalch v. Anderson, supra, the court, speaking 
of newly discovered evidence, stated: 
'' '* * * Is it of that character for which a. new 
trial should have been granted? We think not. 
The evidence, in all .of fits bearings, is at most. only 
cont'11adictory of what respondent said, arnd; that, 
too, upon a collateral matter. Again, assuming 
that it was not merely contradictory, it ·still re-
mains a fact that it did not have great, if any, 
bearing upon the real issue, which issue was : Did 
the original owners establish and acquiesce in a 
boundary line between the Kimball and Rydalch 
lands 1 These facts, as we have pointed out, are 
not even seriously disputed by the evidence. The 
legal effect of the evidence of the Oregon witness, 
therefore, would simply be an attack upon the 
credibility of the respondent as a witness. If all 
that respondent said with regard to what some of 
the Kimball heirs stated to him at or immediately 
preceding the time he bought the land were en-
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tirely ignored, the findings and judgment should 
still he the same." 
Van Horn v. Fa~ific Refining & Roo~fing Co., 27 Cal. 
App. 105, 148 P. 951, 954, discusses newly discovered im-
peachment testimony: 
''The appellant further contends that its mo-
tion for a new trial should have been granted upon 
the ground of newly discovered evidence. The two 
items of newly discovered evidence upon which 
the appellant relied were, first, a written state-
ment of one of the plaintiff's main witnesses as 
to the circuf5tances of the accident, made a day or 
two after its occurrence, which varied in certain 
material respects from his testimony given at 
the trial, and which the defendant claims it could 
have used for the purpose of impeachment of such 
witness, had this written statement been in its 
possession at the time his testimony was given. 
It is a well-established rule, however, that newly 
discove.red evlidence, which is simply impeaching 
or 1cumulative in character, is insufficient to 
support a motion fior a new trial. People v. Gold-
enson, 76 Cal. 328, 19 Pac. 161.'' 
Tuc·son Rapid Transit Co. v. Rubiiaz (Ariz. Feb. 2, 
1920) 21 Ariz. 221, 187 P. 568, 572: 
"The affidavits of witnesses which, appellant 
claims will furnish material evidence on another 
trial, were presented with the motion. The pur-
port of the evidence which, it is claimed, will be 
forthcoming at a new trial, is that the plaintiff 
was suffering from an active case of tuberculosis 
for a long time prior to and continuing up to the 
time of the accident involved. Assuming that the 
showing of diligen'ce made is sufficient, yet such 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
testimony would not preclude a recovery, a.s we 
have seen above. Moreover, the evidence promised 
could be of no service to establish any material 
fact other than the condition of plaintiff's health 
at the time of the accident, and thereby reduce 
the resultant injuries to that of aggravation of her 
diseased condition. The instruction of the court 
permitted the jury to determine plaintiff's dam-
ages arising from aggravation of the di.sease. Ad,.. 
ditional testimony of the physical condition of 
the plaintiff does not call for a new trial. Testi-
mony of witnesses which serves to contradict the 
testimony of the plaintiff, if such is the nature and 
purpose of the newly di.scovered evidence, is not 
of much materiality to the case as to require a 
new trial. The trial court committed no reversible 
error in refusing a new trial upon the alleged 
ground of material evidence newly discovered.'' 
In the case at bar it would seem that whether plain-
tiff's condition a year after his injury called for one or 
two weeks hospitalization was not of sufficient material-
ity to call for a new trial. 
See al.so Waer v. Waer et al., (Cal. June 17, 1922)', 
189 Cal. 178, 207 P. 891; Sa;wyer v. Nelson et ux., (Cal. 
July 15, 1931) 1 P. 2d 1068; White v. Kans,as City Publip 
Servic-e Co., (Kan. Jan. 28, 1933), 18 P. 2d 156, and Pan-
·dol~o et ,al v. Jackson et al. (Cal. Mar. 2, 1936), 55 P. 2d 
550, 552, where the court said: 
'' * * * M oreove;r, it has been s,aid in this 
respect that after defe,at a motJion for new trial 
upon the grounds mentioned is regarded with dis-
trust (lffl)d disfav:orr, and that such 'f1!10ffered new~ 
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-discove~ed evidence is looked upon wlith suspi-
cion.'' 
The trial court in this case made the following erro-
neous statement in its order granting the motion for new 
trial ( R. 038) : 
'' * * * the Court is of the opinion that the 
jury was influenced to the extent that they un-
doubtedly allowed excessive special damages.'' 
Plaintiff testified at the trial, repeated in his coun-
ter-affidavit after defendant's motion for new trial, and 
testified again at the selcond trial that he was actually 
unable to work . during May of 1948 for a period of two 
weeks. No -claim was made by plaintiff for his medical 
expenses. Whether he was in the hospital one week or 
two weeks did not and could not have had any effect 
on plaintiff's special damages. Defendant contends that 
the fact plaintiff was hospitalized one week rather than 
two weeks has a direct bearing on whether or not plain-
tiff was permanently injured. This contention seems 
to be hardly plausible in view of the bulk of testimony 
regarding plaintiff's injuries and after effects. The 
true purpose of the evidence was to impeach plaintiff's 
credibilty. Of that there can be no reasonable doubt. 
This is further borne out by the fact that at the second 
trial there were no witnesses offered by defendant what-
soever regarding the period of plaintiff's hospitalization 
or the treatment which he received at the hospital. Cross-
examination questions were asked and that was the full 
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evidence. 
We submit that said evidence, being simply impeach-
ing in character, was not a legally sufficient reason for 
the trial court to exercise its discretion in granting de-
fendant's motion for new trial. 
(c) The trial court acted arbitrarily and oapri-
ciously in holding that the so-:caUed newly discovered 
evidence would be decisive upon ano,the.r trial or would 
seriously ,affect the result. 
Plaintiff was hospitalized and treated for a per-
iod of one week during the latter part of May, 1948 
at the Southern Pacific General Hospital in San 
Francisco, California. He testified at the trial that 
he was hospitalized for approximately two weeks. 
Hi.s affidavit reveals that he was honestly mistaken as 
to the length of his hospitalization. Can it truly be said 
that the newly discovered evidence was so strong and 
convincing that with its introduction a different result 
would necessarily follow~ Can it be stated with integrity 
that whether plaintiff was hospitalized one week or two 
weeks for treatment a year after his accident made a 
vital i.ssue in this case~ We submit that the trial judge 
who so held acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 
In Turner v. Stevens, 8 Utah 75, 30 P. 24, 25, the 
court stated: 
"The defendant also insists that a new trial 
should have been ordered on the ground of newly 
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discovered evidence. We are disposed to believe 
that the newly discove.red evidence w-ould not be 
dedisive upon arnother trial, and therefore we do 
not feel authorized to order a new trial on account 
of it." 
In BatUmgarten v. Hoffman, 9 Utah 338, 34 P. 294, 
the ~ourt discussed the rule contended for herein: 
''The testimony offered on the trial was con-
flicting. The jury found the issues for the plain-
tiff. There was sufficient evidence to justify the 
verdict, and the judgment should not be disturbed 
on that ground. Nor do we think the newly-dis-
covered evidence was of such a nature as to ser-
iorusly .aff.ec·t the result if it had been known at the 
time, and admitted. The facts stated in the affi-
davit of Quinn are not inconsistent with those 
stated in the affidavit of Baumgarten, and the 
latter clearly explains the former, and tends to 
sustain the testimony given on the trial where 
respondent claims a loss of $20 because of the 
failure of the appellant to complete his contract 
and pay for the goods ordered. A new trial 
should wot be g'rlanted upon the ground of newly-
dis()ove;re.d evidence unless such evidence is very 
cle·ar and s·atisjactory amd likely to seriously 
affect the result W admitted. People v. Sackett, 
14 Mich. 325; Tiernan v. Trewick, 2 Utah, 393; 
Hopkins v. Ogden City, 5 Utah, 390, 16 Pac. Rep. 
596. '' 
Wood v. Akridge (Utah, Oct. 19, 1934) 36 P. 2d 804, 
808: 
''A motion for a new trial was made by de-
fendant based on affidavits indicating newly dis-
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covered evidence. Counter affidavits were filed 
on behalf of plaintiff wherein some of the· allega-
tions in appellant's affidavits were admitted, 
some were denied, and others explained. Had all 
this testimony been before the court at the trial, 
the decision of the court would have been the 
same. There was no error in denying a new trial.'' 
Warshauer Sheep & Wool Co. v. RiO' Gr-ande St:ate 
Bank} (Colo. Apr.18, 1927), 256 P. 21,22: 
''To justify the granting of a new trial on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must ap-
pear, among other things, that ·such evidence 
makes it prob.able that a differ-ent verdict would 
result on a new trial. Walsmith v. Hudson, 77 
Colo. 326, 328, 236 P. 783 ; Eachus v. People, 77 
Colo. 445, 450, 236 P. 1009, and cases there cited." 
Plaintiff testified that he was hospitalized for two 
weeks whereas in truth and in fact he was hospitalized 
for only one week. No special damage issue is involved. 
Can it be honestly contended that the jury's verdict 
would have been different had the testimony been that 
plaintiff was hospitalized one week rather than two 
weeks~ Is it so inconceivable that plaintiff, an uneducated 
colored man, could have been honestly mistaken as to 
the duration of his hospitalization~ Were our trial courts 
allowed to grant new trials for sU:ch light and trivial 
reasons where would there be an end to litigation~ 
What reliance could litigants place upon their right of 
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trial by jury~ What would happen to their constitutional 
right of appeal~ 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 7. (Assignment of 
Error No. 3). 
Instruction No. 7 is herein set forth for the conven-
ience of the court (R. 063): 
''You are instructed that where one may per-
form a duty in either of two ways, one safe and 
the other dangerous, and with full knowledge that 
one method of performing the duty is safe and the 
other dangerous and with full opportunity to 
make a choice as to which method he shall adopt, 
voluntarily chooses the dangerous method, such 
conduct on his part constitutes negligen:ce. 
''Therefore, if you find from a preponderence 
of the evidence in this case that the plaintiff, 
John D. Marshall, was warned of the approach 
of the jitney tractor and that he could have 
stepped onto the chair car or could have stepped 
over to the east with equal ease or could have 
stepped to any other position which was safe, 
but voluntarily chose to remain in a dangerous 
position knowing the same to he dangerous, then 
he is guilty of negligence, and if such negligenbe 
proximately contributed to cause the accident and 
any injuries he claims to have suffered he cannot 
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recover and you must return a verdict for the 
defendant 'no cause of action.' '' 
It is a well known principal of law that where an 
instruction which is correct as an abstract principal of 
law, nevertheless is not supported or warranted by evi-
dence presented in the case, then the instruction is im-
proper and reversible error. 
The question naturally arises therefore as to what 
dangerous position plaintiff voluntarily assumed. If 
there was no evidence of such dangerous position, then, 
of course, the instruction is erroneous. There was nine 
feet of distance between the side of the chair car and 
the umbrella posts running parallel thereto along the 
platform. The four-wheeled truck, which was standing 
on the platform, was approximately three feet in width, 
and its south end was against an umbrella post. It was 
on a slight diagonal. Plaintiff was standing with his 
back against the ~hair car at the time the accident 
occurred. Therefore, he occupied only a few inches of 
space. Marshall testified that there was p~enty of 
room for the jitney and four-wheeled truck to have 
passed between him and the standing four-wheeled truck 
(R. 30, 31). Malan testified positively that there was 
plenty of room for the jitney and four-wheeled truck to 
pro:ceed along the platform to the south and past where 
Marshall was standing (R.lOl, 102). 
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Into what danger did Marshall place himself when 
he chose to remain in hia position next to the chair car 
rather than move to some other position, assuming, of 
course, that the defendant's evidence is to be believed? 
There is simply no answer to that question. There is no 
evidence nor inference deducible from evidence, that it 
waa or would be dangerous for plaintiff to remain next 
to the chair car. If that be true, the instruction 
which authorized the jury to determine that plaintiff 
voluntarily chose to remain in a dangerous position was 
erroneous because entirely unsupported by the evidence. 
Plaintiff's only danger resulted from the manner in 
which Miller operated and manipulated the jitney and 
four-wheeled truck as he proceeded in a southerly direc-
tion to and beyond plaintiff. Plaintiff remained sta-
tionary from the time Miller approached until the acci-
dent occurred. Therefore, his actions, if they ~ontributed 
to the accident at all, must have been in remaining next 
to the chair car. He could not have been negligent in 
taking a dangerous position unless there was something 
in the general situation that would lead a reasonably 
prudent person under the circumstances to believe there 
was danger in the position which he assumed. There is 
no such evidence. The sole and only cause of plaintiff's 
injuries was the manner in which Miller operated the 
jitney. If Miller had proceeded in a proper manner there 
was space for him to have passed beyond where plaintiff 
was standing. He chose to swing the jitney-tractor and 
four-wheeled truck to his left and at the same time failed 
to keep a lookout to his left to determine whether or not 
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such movement could be made in .safety. His evidence is 
interesting in this regard (R. 116): 
'' Q. Weren't you watching the car? 
A. No, I was watching Marshall. 
Q. Didn't you ever watch the truck? 
A. No, I never looked at the truck. 
Q. You could see that car! 
A. I didn't pay any attention. 
Q. You could have seen if you had looked~ 
A. I didn't look at it. My wagon wasn't two 
feet from that wagon, I came up to put the 
box on. 
Q. If you had looked over to the east, you could 
have seen that :car, couldn't you? 
A. I could have. There wasn't nothing between 
me, but I wasn't paying any attention. 
Q. You thought you could get by Mr. Marshall? 
A. I asked him to move his foot box and move 
to the east. 
Q. He didn't move, did he? 
A. He .says he had plenty of room, and I went 
on and caught the end of the wa_gon and it 
swung around and hit the car, and I asked 
him, did it hit you in the stomach?'' 
Plaintiff remained in a position where he had no 
control over the instrumentalities causing the accident. 
Thereafter, Miller could have either traveled so slow as 
to prevent a skidding of his four-wheeled truck sideways 
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and against the car, or he could have kept a lookout to 
the east and determined with certainty whether or not 
the four-wheeled truck was clearing the standing truck, 
or he could have done both of these things. Plaintiff 
was entitled to rely upon Miller operating the jitney and 
four-wheeled truck in a careful and prudent manner. 
The evidence in this case simply does not warrant 
Instruction No. 7. As a matter of law plaintiff did not 
voluntarily choose to remain in a dangerous position. 
His position in and of itself was not dangerous. Malan 
did not think it was dangerous and there was no evidence 
from which a jury could infer that it was dangerous. The 
only danger which could exist for plaintiff was danger 
created by the manner in which the jitney was operated. 
As will be discussed in detail under Point III, he was 
under no duty to anti.cipate danger which could only 
come to him through the negligent operation of the jitney 
and four-wheeled truck. We, therefore, submit for the 
reasons discussed herein and under Point III that plain-
tiff was seriously prejudiced by said instruction which 
was unwarranted under the facts of this case. 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THE 
SUBMISSION OF 'THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY. (Assignment of 
Errors No. 2, 3 and 5). 
Defendant had the burden of introducing evidence 
in support of its allegations of contributory negligence. 
It is plaintiff's contention that defendant failed to sus-
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tain itB burden and that there was no evidentiary basis 
for submission of the issue of contributory negligence 
to the jury. 
As has been heretofore pointed out, even under defen-
dant's evidence, plaintiff never once moved from his 
position after the jitney started past him. It is also .clear 
that plaintiff had no other position to which he could 
retire in the event the moving truck were to skid ·Bide-
ways and into him. Even assuming that plaintiff mo-
tioned :Jiiller to continue in his southward movement, the 
evidence is neverthless undisputed that there was plenty 
of room for l\filler to have passed by Marshall had he 
operated the jitney and truck in a careful and prudent 
manner. Marshall's conduct had come to rest. Miller's 
conduct was continuing. Marshall was in a position from 
which he could not extricate himself; Miller was in a 
position whereby he could have prevented the accident bYi 
the exercise of ordinary care. Furthermore, Marshall 
was entitled to assume that Miller would operate the 
jitney and truck in a careful and prudent manner. 
Marshall was under no obligation to anticipate that Mil-
ler would be negligent in operating the vehicle. 
In Mathews v. D~aly West Mining Co., 27 Utah 193, 
75 P. 722 ( 1904), plaintiff was an employee of an ore 
mill. The superintendent told him that he was going to 
shut the mill down for one-half hour and for plaintiff 
to look the mill over while it was down. In making his 
check plaintiff discovered a cap nearly off. He procured 
a candle and wrench and laid across a belt in order to 
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tighten the cap. While thus situated and engaged the 
mill was suddenly and unexpectedly started and plain-
tiff was injured. It was contended by defendant that the 
safe method of tightening the cap was for a workman to 
get down underneath and lie on his back while someone 
else held a candle and that he thus could have tightened 
the cap without being exposed to danger although the 
mill was in operation, or placed in operation while the 
task was being performed. The testimony indicated 
that the method suggested and the method being used 
by plaintiff were each safe as long as the mill was not in 
operation. It was proved that it was customary to give 
a warning when the mill was about to start. No such 
warning was given. Defendant contended that as plain-
tiff knew of a safe method in which to perform the work 
but chose a dangerous method he was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence. The court stated: 
''They rely upon the well-settled rule of law 
that when the servant knows, or by the: exercise 
of ordinary care can ascertain, that there are both 
safe and dangerous ways by which he can per-
form his duties, if he voluntarily chooses to pur-
sue one of the ways that is dangerous, he assumes 
the natural and ordinary risk incident to the way 
he has chosen* * *'' 
and that 
"It is also well settled that the negligence of 
the master is not among the risks so assumed by 
the servant. Therefore when the servant, in the 
discharge of his duties, is in a position which is, 
under the conditions which then exist, naturally 
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safe, but is suddenly made dangerous by the neg-
ligence of the master, and the injury to the· servant 
is immediately caused thereby, the master is 
liable.'' 
In JicCulloch v. Horton, (Mont.), 56 P. 2d 1344, 
1346, action was brought by plaintiff for personal injuries 
sustained by him while on defendant's premises through 
the alleged negligent operation of a truck by defendant. 
It appeared from the facts that plaintiff was standing 
near defendant's garage door and that the defendant was 
backing a truck out of the garage. There was some evi-
dence that he backed out unusually fast and some that 
he didn't back out straight. At any rate the truck struck 
the side of the door frame and caused a portion of the 
truck to fall down and strike the plaintiff inflicting 
injuries. 
Defendant contended that plaintiff was familiar with 
the operation of the truck and the fact that the portion 
of the truck which fell was sometime.s not held in place 
by hooking chains and that plaintiff covuld have O'C'cupied 
a ,position of greater safety and was therefotre guilty O'f 
negligence. The court overruled defendant's contention 
in this regard and stated: 
"Mere knowledge of the existence of an of-
fending instrumentality at the place whe·re· an 
injury is suffered does not raise a legal presump-
tion of contributory negligence, unless it further 
appears that the plaintiff had reason to apprehend 
danger. Hughey v. Fergus County, 98 Mont. 98, 
37 P. (2d) 1035; Mullins v. City of Butte, 93 
Mont. 601, 20 P. (2d) 626; Neilson v. l\1issoula 
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Creamery Co., 59 Mont. 270, 196 P. 357. The fail-
ure to anticipate negligence which results in in-
jury is not negligence and will not defeat the ac-
tion for the injury sustained. 20 R.C.L. 118; Cen-
tral Railroad Co. v. De Busley (C.C.A.) 261 F. 
561; Wagner v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 
252 Pa. 354, 97 A. 471; North Bend Lumber Co. 
v. Seattle, 116 Wash. 500, 199 P. 988, 19 A.L.R. 
415. '' 
In Greenwood v. Summers, ,et 'al., (Cal.) 149 P. 2d 
35, 37, the court stated: 
''In determining, in the present case, whether 
Misko exercised the care which a man of common 
prudence would have exercised, the trial court 
undoubtedly relied upon the law and the e:vidence. 
So far as the law is concerned, section 527 (a) of 
the Vehicle Code, St. 1935, p. 182, states it as fol-
lows : 'Drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite 
directions shall pass each other to the right, and, 
except when a roadway has been divided into 
traffic lanes, each driver shall give to the other at 
least one-half of the main traveled portion of the 
roadway whenever p'ossible.' So far as the evi-
dence is concerned, the court would have been 
warranted in finding that Summers violated this 
statute and trespassed on territory reserved for 
traffic going south. Misko, running generally at 
a distance of approximately two feet west of the 
center white line, in our opinion, might justly 
have considered that he was safe from a collision 
with northbound traffic. Under those circum-
stances, it is understandable that the trial court 
would fail to find him guilty of negligence. The 
general rule is that every person who is himself 
exercising ordinary care has a ri_ght to presume 
that every other person will perform his duty and 
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obey the law, and in the absence of reasonable 
ground to think otherwise it is not negligence to 
assume that he is not exposed to danger which 
comes to him only from violation of law or duty 
by such other person. See Harris v. Johnson, 
1916, 17-! Cal. 55, 58, 161 P. 1155, L.R.A. 1917C, 
477, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 560; Pinello v. Taylor, 1933, 
128 Cal. App. 508,512,17 P. 2d 1039." 
See also Pinello v. Taylor (Cal.) 17 P. 2d 1039, and 
Boweq-s et ux v. Foster et ux., (Wash.) 278 P. 1072. 
In Beck v. Sirota (Cal.) 109 P. 2d 419, 423, plain-
tiff was stationed on a scaffold working. An automobile 
underneath the scaffold being driven away by an em-
ployee of defendant, caught on an electric light cord 
hanging from the scaffold causing plaintiff to lose hia 
position and fall. The court, in discussing contributory 
negligence, stated : 
'' * * * Plaintiff had a right to presume that 
the defendant and his agents would perform their 
duty by removing the machines in such a manner 
as would avoid injuring the cleaners. It is a 
general rule that every perBon has a right to 
presume that every other person has performed 
his duty and obeyed the law. In the absenlce of 
reasonable grounds to think otherwise, it is not 
negligelice for him to assume that he is n:ot ex-
posed to danger which can come to him only from 
a violation of law or duty by such other person. 
Robbiano v. Bovet, 218 Cal. 589, at page 597, 24 
P. 2d 466; Harris v. J:ohnaon, 17 4 Cal. 55, at page 
58, 161 P. 1155, L.R.A. 1917C, 477, Ann. Cas. 
1918E, 560; Moreno v. Los Angeles Transfer Co., 
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44 Cal. App. 551, 186 P. 800; Medlin v. Spazier, 
23 Cal. App. 242, 137 P. 1078." 
In Hechler et al v. McDonrnell (Cal.) 109 P. 2d 426, 
428, plaintiff was sitting on a sto·ol in a restaurant. 
While she was so lo.cated one of defendant's employees 
mopped the platform around the stool. When plaintiff 
arose and stepped onto the platform she slipped and 
was injured. Again the court in discussing contributory 
negligence and plaintiff's right to rely upon defendant 
refraining from negligence which would cause her to 
suffer injury, stated: 
'' * * * Even if plaintiff had given any 
thought to the platform before rising from the 
stool, she would have been justified in assuming 
that it had been mopped properly and in a man-
ner that would not endanger her safety, and that 
appellant would not expose her to a danger that 
would come to her only through a violation of his 
duty to her. 20 R.C.L. 66; De Verdi v. Weiss, 
16 Cal. App. 2d 439, 60 P. 2d 879; Tuttle v. 
Crawford, 8 Cal. 2d 126, 63 P. 2d 1128." 
Marshall was not guilty of contributory negligence 
for the following reasons: (1) there was no evidence 
from which a jury could find that the position which he 
assumed was dangerous ; ( 2) after the jitney proceeded 
past Marshall, Miller had it within hi;:; power to prevent 
the accident and Marshall did not. 
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POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT 
THE ISSUE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE TO THE JURY. 
(Assignment of Errors No. 2 and 5). 
The doctrine of last clear chance is traceable to the 
celebrated case of Davies v. Marnn, 10M & W 548 (1842). 
In that case plaintiff, having hobbled his jack ass, turned 
it out to graze on a public highway, 8 yards wide. Here 
the ass remained, and was peacefully _grazing on the side 
of the road, when defendant's wagon and horses, came 
down a slight descent, ran against and injured the ass. 
The driver of the wagon was. ~areless in being ·some dis-
tance behind his horses while they were proceeding along 
the highway at a rapid pace. The court decided that as 
defendant might by proper care have avoided injuring 
the animal, he was liable for the consequences of his 
negligence even though plaintiff himself was guilty of 
negligence in hobbling the ass and turning it on a public 
highway. 
Since the decision in Davies v. Ma'YI!Yb, the doctrine of 
last clear chance has developed into a well-established 
and universally recognized principle and has been applied 
to numerous fact situations. 
The generally accepted rule is well stated in Girdner 
v. Union Oil Compa;ny of Califo·rnia, (decided Aug. 9, 
1932) 13 P. 2d 915, 917: 
'' * • * The apparent confusion which exists 
in some of the decisions upon the subject arises in 
the application of the law to the facts, but as 
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to the rule itself there is little or no confusion. 
It would be a strange case indeed, to say the 
least, that would declare it to be permissible to 
run down and injure one simply because he was 
in a position of peril of which he was unaware, 
without responding in damages for his willful act. 
Such, of course, is not the law. A defendant is 
never relieved of liability if he has it in his power 
to prevent the injury. This doctrine applies 
whether one is unaware of his peril by reason of 
his negligence, or when exercising ordinary care is 
so ignorant. In either situation the rule is the 
same. A defendant is not privileged to ilnjure 
ano 1ther simply because he is rnegligently or other-
wise in ·a p~osition of danger. If he has the oppor-
tunJity of avoiding the injury, he must at his peA'il 
·exercise it. The rule of the last clear chance means 
just what the words imply. A party who has the 
last .chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding 
the previous negligence of a plaintiff, is solely 
responsible. Townsend v. Butterfield, 168 Cal. 
564, 143 P. 760; Harrington v. Los Angeles Ry. 
Co., 140 Cal. 514, 526, 74 P. 15, 63 L.R.A. 238, 
98 Am. St. Rep. 85; Palmer v. Tschudy, 191 Cal. 
696, 218 P. 36; Berguin v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 
203 Cal. 116, 263 P. 220; Darling v. Pacific Elec. 
Ry. Co., 197 Cal. 702, 242 P. 703; Atkins v. Bou-
chet, 86 Cal. A pp. 294, 260 P. 828 ; 0 'Farrell 
v. Andrus, 86 Cal. App. 474, 260 P. 957; Smith et 
al. v. Los Angeles Ry., 105 Cal. App., 657, 288 P. 
690.'' 
Defendant's theory was that Miller stopped a short 
'distance north of where plaintiff was standing, had a 
conversation with plaintiff and thereafter proceeded in 
a southerly direction past plaintiff at which time the 
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four-wheeled truck cornered with a standing truck and 
swung around striking plaintiff. 
In view of defendant's eviden:ce plaintiff requested 
an instruction on the doctrine of last clear chance in 
its Requested Instruction No. 3, which was refused by 
the trial court (R. 042). Under the facts as presented 
by defendant we submit that a jury could well have found, 
as in the old Davies v. Mann case, that plaintiff when he 
chose to remain alongside the coach and allow the jitney 
and truck to pa.ss had effectively hobbled himself, and 
that thereafter, just as in the Dav1ies v. Mawn case, de-
fendant drove along with its jitney and trU:ck at an exces-
sive rate of speed and without keeping a proper lookout, 
running against plaintiff and causing him to sustain 
his injuries. In other word.s, as the jitney passed where 
plaintiff was standing he then was placed in a position 
from which he could not extricate himself. We believe 
that every necessary prerequisite of the doctrine of last 
clear chance was present as a jury issue under the fact.s. 
We do not by this statement wish it to be understood that 
we are willing to assume that plaintiff was himself 
guilty of contributory negligence. We believe there was 
no evidence to justify such a finding. However, plain-
tiff '.s conduct had :come to rest and he was in a position 
from which he could not extricate himself, or so the 
jury could find, when the jitney tractor started past him. 
In the case of Michig(Jfn City v. Werner (Ind. Dec. 
1916), 114 N.E. 636, 186 Ind. 149, the plaintiff was cross-
ing a bridge when it was raised by the bridge tender. 
Defendant requested an instruction that the jury should 
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find for the defendant if plaintiff was negligent in en-
tering upon the bridge in an attempt to ~ross it. This in-
struction was refused by the trial court for the reason 
that contributory negligence is not a defense where the 
last clear chance situation exists and that it is improper 
and erroneous for a court to nstruct the jury that contri-
butory negligence will bar recovery unless the jury is at 
the same time instructed that if the defendant had the 
last clear chance to have avoided the accident and in-
juries then plaintiff's negligence would not bar recovery 
and plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict. The court 
stated: 
''Instruction No. 4, refused by the court, if 
given, would have been in conflict with instruction 
No. 7, which properly states the law. The instruc-
tion refused directed the jury, in effect, to find 
for the defendant if it appeared that the plaintiff 
was negligent in entering upon the bridge in an 
attempt to cross it. Under the doctrine of last 
clear chance, as ·stated in instruction No. 7, to 
the effect that if the injury to the plaintiff was 
immediately caused by the negligence of the 
bridge tender after he became aware of the dan-
gerous situation of plaintiff and to his failure 
to use ordinary care to avoid injury to him, then 
the plaintiff was entitled to recover notwithstand-
ing his prior negligence in entering upon the 
bridge.'' 
In Teakle v. Sam Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Ca., (de-
cided May 9, 1'907), 32 Utah 276, 90 P. 402, 408, decedent, 
a licensee on defendant's railroad track, stepped in front 
of a backing train, consisting of an engine, tender, mail 
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car, and baggage car. He was struck by the baggage car 
and thrown between the rails. No part of the train 
injured him until he was struck by the firebox of the 
engine, which rolled, dragged and crushed him to death. 
The brakeman on the end of the baggage car gave sig-
nals to the engineer to stop as soon as decedent was 
struck but was unable to attract the engineer's attention. 
Another witne.ss ran along the track on the fireman's side 
of the train and attempted to attract his attention, but 
Was unable to do so. There was evidence that decedent 
was alive until struck by the firebox, and that had the 
brakes been applied immediately after decedent was first 
struck, the train could have been stopped before the fire-
box reached him. The trial court directed a verdict in 
favor of defendant, and the Supreme Court of Utah 
reversed on the ground that the case should have been 
submitted to the jury under the doctrine of last clear 
chance, and .stated: 
"* * * This court, in harmony with the great 
weight of authority, seems to be committed to 
the rule (when the injured or deceased person was 
not a trespasser) that the defendant's act of negli-
gence will be regarded as the sole proximate cause 
of the injury, not only when relating to a breach 
of duty occurring after the consequences of con-
tributory negligence have been discovered, but 
al.so when, in the exercise of ordinary care, such 
consequences could have been discovered, if a 
breach of duty intervened or :continued after the 
commission of the contributory negligence. While 
the breach of duty must be :subsequent to the com-
mission of the contributory negligence, yet such 
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breach of duty may be before, as well as after, 
the discovery of the peril. This principle of law 
has often been illustrated by cases where the 
owner of stock was guilty of negligence in per-
mitting it to stray upon the railroad track, and 
where the liability of the company was made to 
depend, not only upon the question of whether the 
train operatives .could have avoided the injury 
after the animal was discovered on or near the 
track, but also whether, in the exercise of ordinary 
care, the train operatives could or ought to have 
discovered it in time to have avoided the injury. 
So also in cases where one was guilty of negli-
gence in the first instance in going upon the track 
and by reason of being caught in a frog, or was 
otherwise rendered unable to escape, and where 
the railroad company was held liable, not only 
for an omission of duty on the part of the train 
operatives after discovering the peril, but also for 
an omission of duty in not discovering it. In such 
cases the contributory negligence is deemed the 
remote, and the defendant's negligence the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. Such is the principle of 
law which seems to have been announced by this 
court in the case of Hall v. Railway Co., 13 Utah 
243, 44 Pac. 1046, 57 Am. St. Rep. 726, and in 
the case of Shaw v. City R. R. Co., 21 Utah 77, 
59 Pac. 552, and is the principle of law stated in 
the instruction which this court approved, and 
which was involved in the question decided by the 
court, in the case of Thompson v. Salt Lake Rapid 
Transit Co., 16 Utah 281, 52 Pac. 92, 40 L.R.A. 
172, 67 Am. St. Rep. 621, and is well illustrated in 
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Inland & Seaboard Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 139 
U.S. 557, 11 Sup. Ct. 653, 35 L. Ed. 270, and in 
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 12 
Sup. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485. '' 
The court's error in refusing to instruct on the doc-
trine of last clear chance was rendered manife,stly more 
prejudicial to plaintiff when Instruction No. 7 ia con-
sidered in connection with this subject. The court not only 
refused to allow the jury to consider the doctrine of last 
clear chance, but instructed the jury that if Marshall 
chose to remain in a dangerous position knowing the 
same to be dangerous, then he was guilty of contributory 
negligence, and in ·.such event was not entitled to recover. 
In other words, the court attacked plaintiff's position in 
both a negative and an affirmative manner, refusing 
to instruct on last clear chance and further eliminating 
the doctrine in its application to the facts by instruc-
ting that if plaintiff was contributorily negligent he could 
not recover. 
Some jurisdictions have held that the doctrine of 
last clear chance applies only where plaintiff has placed 
himself, deliberately or otherwise, in a dangerous posi-
tion. Defendant, however, is precluded from taking this 
position, for Instruction No. 7 allows the jury to find 
that plaintiff chose to remain in a dangerous position. 
If there waa no evidence of a dangerous position, Instruc-
tion No. 7 is erroneous. If there was evidence of a dan-
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gerous position, all doubt as to the applicability of the 
doctrine of last clear chance is relieved. In either event 
error was committed by the trial court which prejudi-
cially affected plaintiff's rights under the law. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Judge Hendricks 
abused his legal discretion when he granted defendant's 
motion for a new trial for the following reasons: 
1. Defendant was not required as a condition prece-
dent to affirmatively show that it had exercised due dili-
gence prior to and during the trial in discovering the 
so-called newly discovered evidence. 
2. The so-called newly discovered evidence was 
offered and ultimately used for the sole purpose of im-
peachment. 
3. Said evidence could not have seriously affected 
the results of the trial. 
It is futher submitted that the second trial court 
committed prejudicial error when it submitted the issue 
of contributory negligence and at the same time refused 
to submit the issue of last clear chance to the jury. 
Plaintiff was denied his constitutionally guaranteed 
right of a fair and just trial by jury. We therefore re-
spectfully submit that the jury'·s verdict at the conclusion 
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of the second trial and judgment thereon should be set 
aside, and also that the original verdict should be rein-
stated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK & ROBERTS 
DWIGHT L. KING 
WAYNE L. KING 
.At~orrneys for PlainffiJf/ and, .AppeUam~ 
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